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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,

:

Petitioner/Appellant,

:

v.

:

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Respondent/Appellee.

Case No. 20010367-SC

Priority No. 3

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner appeals from an order dismissing his petition for extraordinary relief, which
challenged his conviction for Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated § 76-6-302. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(i) and § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (2001).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue I: Should petitioner's claims be dismissed because they are inadequately
briefed?
Standard of Review: "Briefs that do not comply with rule 24 'may be disregarded
or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court.' Utah R. App. P. 24(j)." State v. Gamblin,
2000UT44,f 8,1 P.3d 1108.

1

Issue II: Did the district court properly dismiss with prejudice the petition for
extraordinary relief?
Standard of Review: The following standard of review applies:
"On appeal from denial of habeas corpus relief, 'we survey the record in the
light most favorable to the findings and judgment, and we will not reverse if
there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's refusal to be
convinced that the writ should be granted.'"... Furthermore, we will set aside
the district court's findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, and we
review its conclusions of law for correctness.
Seel v. Van Per Veur. 971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1998) (cites omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relate to this appeal:
Addendum A - Former Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Prior convictions.1 Petitioner Thomas had previously been convicted of aggravated
robbery and aggravated kidnaping in 1980, for which he received sentence of 5 years to life
(R. 1903-11). He was conditionally released by the Board of Pardons upon parole on April
13, 1993 (R. 1915, 1919).
Arrest warrant. On June 18,1993, a warrant for arrest was issued by the Utah State
Board of Pardons against petitioner Thomas (R. 1927). The arrest warrant stated that there
was reason to believe that the parole violations of 1) Curfew Violation; 2) Failure to

1

The fact that petitioner was on parole from his previous conviction is relevant to
the argument concerning his arrest and revocation hearing.
2

Maintain Employment; and 3) Failure to Reside at Residence of Record had been committed.
The warrant authorized the arrest of the petitioner, and return to actual custody pending a
determination of probable cause to believe he had violated the conditions of his parole (R.
1927).
The search warrant and arrest. As part of their investigation of a robbery of a
Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant which occurred on June 30,1993, police received a lead
on petitioner Thomas. While some officers guarded his apartment, others went to obtain a
search warrant. On July 1, 1993, Third District Court Commissioner Frances M. Palacios
issued a search warrant (R. 1896 and 1937). After obtaining the search warrant, the police
officers returned to the scene. Shortly thereafter, petitioner surrendered, and the apartment
was searched. During the search, the police seized evidence linking petitioner to the crime
(R. 1896). Petitioner was then arrested and booked on charges of aggravated robbery and
parole violation (R. 1929). On July 6,1993, Commissioner Palacios signed an arrest warrant
for the crime of aggravated robbery (R. 1931).
Prerevocation hearing notice. On July 7, 1993, petitioner was served with a copy
of the prerevocation hearing information, which advised him of his right to a prerevocation
hearing (R. 1933-35). This notice also advised the petitioner that if he waived his prerevocation hearing, he would be returned to prison for a full revocation hearing by the Board
of Pardons. Petitioner signed the document, specifically waiving his right to a prerevocation
hearing (R. 1935).

3

Underlying criminal case - #931901914. On July 6,1993 an information was filed
which charged petitioner with one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony,
contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, for the robbery of the Kentucky Fried Chicken
restaurant (R. 1937). The information also alleged that a firearm was used in the robbery (R.
1937). On August 4,1995, a jury convicted petitioner of one count of aggravated robbery,
as charged (R. 1940). Petitioner was sentenced to five years to life in prison, to run
consecutively with the sentence he was already serving (R. 1942).
Appeal. Petitioner appealed his conviction (R. 1944). The Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction in a memorandum decision. State v. Thomas. No. 960170-CA (Utah App.
Nov. 29, 1996)(unpublished) (R. 1947-49). The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari (R.
1951). The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. See State v.
Thomas. 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998) (R. 1895-1901) (addendum B).
As to the portion of the case that was remanded, the Court of Appeals affirmed
petitioner's conviction on February 24,1999(R. 1953-54) (addendum C). A petition for writ
of certiorari was denied (R. 1962).
State petition for extraordinary relief which is being appealed. On February 7,
1995, (prior to his conviction and his subsequent appeal), petitioner filed a petition for
extraordinary relief. He filed an amended petition on March 27, 1995. On December 21,
1995, (after conviction) the district court dismissed the petition as premature, because the
petitioner had an adequate remedy of direct appeal. The Findings, Conclusions and Order

4

was entered on January 9, 1996 (R. 1981-84).2 Petitioner appealed. On May 14, 1996, the
Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition (R. 1986)
(addendum D).
Petitioner also filed in the Supreme Court a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a
motion to consolidate his habeas petition with his petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court
remanded the petition for writ of habeas corpus back to the district court for disposition3 and
denied the motion to consolidate (R. 1988-91). Then, for unknown reasons, on September

2

Subsequent petitions. On June 11, 1997, petitioner filed a new petition, case
#970904051 (R. 2003-4). On August 18, 1997, petitioner filed another petition, case
#970905822 (R. 2006-8). These two cases were consolidated and petitioner was given an
opportunity to amend (R. 2004). The case was dismissed without prejudice because
petitioner failed to ever submit an amended petition (R. 2010-24).
Federal petitions. Petitioner filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking
relief on the basis that the search warrant was invalid. The case was dismissed under 28
U.S.C. 1915(d). The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Thomas v. Palacios. 73
F.3d 374, 1995 WL 758970 (10th Cir. (Utah)) rhrg denied June 25, 1996 (Unpublished)
(R. 2016-17).
After the Utah Supreme Court's decision holding that the commissioner did not
have authority to issue the search warrant, petitioner filed a motion seeking relief
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district
court's denial of petitioner's motion. Thomas v. Palacios, 194 F.3d 1321, 1999 WL
710340 (10th Cir.(Utah)) (Unpublished) (R. 2019-20).
In 1996, petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 and 2254. He alleged that his conviction and sentence were unconstitutional because a commissioner lacked judicial authority to issue the arrest and search
warrants. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld denial of the petition. Thomas v.
State, 134 F.3d 383, 1998 WL 39232 (10th Cir. (Utah)(Unpublished) (R. 2022-23).
3

It is likely that the petition was simply remanded to the district court because the
district court was the appropriate place to file the petition. The Supreme Court may not
have been aware that petitioner had previously filed a petition for extraordinary relief in
district court, which had already been dismissed.
5

21,1998, in case #981532, the Supreme Court entered an order stating: The district court is
directed to reinstate the Petitioner's Petition for Habeas Corpus and to process it." (R. 1993).4
On September 24, 1998, Third District Court Judge Lewis entered a signed minute
entry stating that the court had already considered and dismissed the legal issues raised. The
court reiterated that there was no legal basis for the petitioner's release (R. 1995). On
January 11, 1999, Pat Bartholomew, Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, sent petitioner
Thomas a letter stating:
this court is without jurisdiction to take further action in the above referenced
case . . . By order, dated September 21, 1998, this court directed the Third
District Court to reinstate and process your petition for habeas corpus. It
appears that such order was complied with and Judge Lewis made a minute
entry, dated September 24, 1998, finding no legal basis for your release. A
copy of that order is enclosed. This court's case file was closed November 29,
1998).
(R. 1997).
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that Judge Lewis had dismissed the case, and the
letter from the Supreme Court acknowledges that dismissal, after the recusal of Judge Lewis,
the case was subsequently reassigned to several other district court judges who successively
recused themselves. After a status and scheduling conference, the state was ordered to file
a response. On July 21, 1999, the state filed its response (R. 1682-87).

4

In its response to the petition to the district court, the respondent speculated that
in this order, the Supreme Court was probably addressing the subsequent petition filed in
case #970905822, rather than case #950900814, which had already been dismissed.
6

On February 2, 2000, District Court Judge Noel entered a minute entry stating: "It
appears to the Court then that this matter has been dismissed with prejudice, and accordingly,
the Court will take no further action in this matter as the case is deemed to be closed by the
Court." (R. 1998-2001). Petitioner then filed a motion to vacate the minute entry. Oral
argument on this issue was held on June 23, 2000. The Court granted the motion to vacate
the minute entry and ordered respondent to file another response to the petition.
On August 28,2000, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss as its response (R. 186293). Petitioner filed a Reply (R. 2038-65) and respondent filed a Response to the new issues
raised in the Reply (R. 2111-29). On February 22, 2001, the District Court entered its
Memorandum Decision, which granted the respondent's Motion to Dismiss (R. 2380-86)
(addendum E). On August 22,2001 Findings and Conclusions and a Final Order were filed
by the Court (addendum F).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
FROM THE CRIMINAL TRIAL5
"On the night of June 30, 1993, an armed robbery was committed at a fast food
restaurant [Kentucky Fried Chicken] in Salt Lake County, Utah. At gun point, the assailant
ordered the manager to put all the money into a bag and to accompany him to the parking lot.
The manager was then released, and the assailant ran away. Shortly thereafter, police
officers arrived on the scene and began their investigation of the robbery. As part of their

5

These facts are quoted directly from State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 300 (Utah
1998) (R. 1896) (addendum B).
7

investigation, they received a lead on a suspect who was reported to be in a nearby apartment.
The suspect was defendant Richard Dee Thomas. When the police arrived at the apartment,
a confrontation ensued with Thomas. The officers forced entry into the apartment but
retreated after Thomas threatened to kill a hostage.6 Then, while some officers guarded the
apartment, others went to obtain a search warrant.
During the early morning of July 1,1993, Third District Court Commissioner Frances
M. Palacios issued a search warrant. After obtaining the search warrant, the police officers
returned to the scene. Shortly thereafter, Thomas surrendered, and the apartment was
searched. During the search, the police seized evidence linking Thomas to the crime.7 On
July 2,1993, the manager of the restaurant was shown a photo array of six men and identified
Thomas as the man who committed the robbery. During interrogation and after Thomas
waived his Miranda rights, Thomas confessed to committing the armed robbery. On July 6,
1993, the State filed an information against Thomas, charging him with aggravated robbery,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302."
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Petitioner's claims should be dismissed because they are inadequately briefed.
Petitioner's argument section is disjointed and confusing. Petitioner has not properly
marshaled the evidence supporting the district court's ruling.
6

He does not provide

It later turned out that there was no hostage.

7

The items seized included a baseball cap, sunglasses, gun, and bank bags with
coin wrappers and gift certificates. (R. 1953) (addendum C).
8

meaningful legal analysis or appropriately challenge the decisions of the district court.
Instead, he merely sets out points which attempt to assert the same arguments raised in his
petition for extraordinary relief. This does not conform to the requirements of the briefing
rule.
Even if petitioner's brief is not dismissed for inadequacy, the decision of the district
court should be affirmed because the petition for extraordinary relief was properly dismissed.
The district court correctly ruled that petitioner was not entitled to relief because some of his
claims were already raised on appeal, or could have been raised on appeal. The district court
also correctly ruled that petitioner was not entitled to relief because he was properly arrested
on a Parole Board warrant. In the alternative, any irregularities in the arrest warrant or
charging information were cured by the subsequent valid conviction.
ARGUMENT
L

PETITIONER'S CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE
THEY ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED.

Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for extraordinary relief. However, in
his appellate brief, petitioner simply raises the same arguments he raised in his petition.8
Petitioner does not properly challenge the decisions of the district court. He has not argued

8

Petitioner also attempts to raise some new issues which were never raised in his
petition. If a claim was not raised in the petition, and was therefore not addressed by the
district court, it will not be addressed for the first time on appeal. See Pascual v. Carver,
876 P.2d 364, 366 (Utah 1994). The issues concerning petitioner's confession and the
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(3) were not raised in the extraordinary
petition. They therefore may not be addressed now.
9

or established that any of the court's findings were clearly erroneous, or that its conclusions
of law were incorrect. Rather than provide meaningful legal analysis, petitioner merely
repeats the legal arguments that failed in the district court below, and concludes that he is
entitled to relief, without explaining how he contends the district court erred. This does not
conform to the requirements of the briefing rule.
Inadequate Briefing. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant
to include his "contentions and reasons . .. with respect to the issues presented," including
"the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on." Rule 24(a)(9) Utah R. App. P. (2000).
See also State v. Gamblin. 2000 UT 44, f 6, 1 P.3d 1108 (refusing to consider argument
which is inadequately briefed); MacKav v. Hardy, 973 P.2d94L 947-48 (Utah 1998). Utah
courts have consistently held that issues not properly briefed should not be addressed on
appeal. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). "'A reviewing court is
entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited.'" State v. Snyder,
932 R2d 120,130 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d439.450 (Utah 1988)).
Petitioner has not properly briefed the issues. His brief does not identify specific
errors by the district court. It does not cite to the record, nor does it provide meaningful legal
analysis. See State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992); Phillips v. Hatfield. 904 P.2d
1108 (Utah App. 1995). Petitioner does not provide any clear analytical basis for his claim
that denial of his petition for extraordinary relief should be overturned on appeal. See State

10

v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998) (holding that "rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald
citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority"); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (holding that brief "must
contain some support for each contention").
Petitioner's brief also fails to make clear assertions, leaving to the State and this
Court, the task of divining his position. MacKay, 973 P.2d at 948-49 (rejecting appellee's
and cross-appellant's claim for failure to make clear assertions or to engage in even a
"modicum of analysis" where appellee merely "quote[d] or paraphrase[d] the record at great
length, leaving [the] court with the task of attempting to divine [appellee's] position"). This
Court is not "'a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument
and research."' State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404,410 (Utah 1999) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)), and see Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. Accordingly, petitioner's
claims should be rejected. See Jaeger, 973 P.2d at 410 (refusing to consider appellant's
claim due to the lack of meaningful analysis of cited authority); Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966
(refusing to address claim on appeal where petitioner's brief "wholly [lacked] legal analysis
and authority to support his argument"); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 548-49 (Utah App.
1998) (same); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (same).
Failure to Marshal. Petitioner's claims also fail because his grounds for relief
ignore the district court's findings and conclusions in support of its rulings. The law is wellsettled that although the Court of Appeals will "review the trial court's conclusions of law
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for correctness, [it] will disturb findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. Further,
"'we survey the record in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and we will
not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's refusal to be
convinced that the writ should be granted.'"" Matthews v. Galetka. 958 P.2d 949,950 (Utah
App. 1998) (citations omitted).
A court's findings are "clearly erroneous only if they 'are against the clear weight of
the evidence'" or if the reviewing court '"reaches a definite and firm conviction'" that they
are mistaken. State v. Gardner. 844 P.2d 293,295 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Walker, 743
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). The burden is on the petitioner to marshal all of the evidence
in support of the district court's findings and then to demonstrate that the evidence does not
support the findings. State v. Alvarez. 872 P.2d 450,460-61 (Utah 1994). If the petitioner
makes no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting the court's ruling and to demonstrate
its insufficiency, this Court "accept[s] the trial court's findings as stated in its ruling." State
v. Benvenuto. 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999).
Petitioner fails to carry his burden. Indeed, petitioner does not even acknowledge his
burden to marshal the evidence supporting the district court's ruling. Instead, he refers only
to facts or events which he believes are favorable to his position and then broadly asserts that
he is entitled to relief. Because petitioner has failed to marshal the supporting evidence and
demonstrate its insufficiency, this Court should accept the district court's findings.
Benvenuto. 983 P.2d at 558.
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Petitioner's claims are inadequately briefed and neither marshal the evidence supporting the district court's findings, nor demonstrate its inadequacy. Therefore, this Court should
decline to consider petitioner's challenge to the district court's ruling dismissing his petition
for extraordinary relief. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991)
(failure to marshal evidence); Jaeger. 973 P.2d at 410 (failure to meaningfully analyze claim).
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED AND
DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF.

Even if this Court excuses the failures of petitioner's brief, review of the action below
nevertheless establishes that the district court properly denied and dismissed the petition for
extraordinary relief.
A.

The district court properly dismissed the petition for extraordinary
relief because petitioner's complaints centered on pretrial matters
that were either resolved on appeal, could have been resolved on
appeal, or were of such a nature that they would not invalidate the
conviction and sentence.

In making its decision to dismiss the petition, the district court found that petitioner
was not entitled to extraordinary relief because some of his claims had already been
addressed on appeal, or could have been raised and addressed on appeal. Petitioner was
therefore procedurally barred from raising them in his petition for extraordinary relief.9 The
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Ruling that claims are procedurally barred has important ramifications in future
federal habeas review. Federal courts will likely not adhere to a state court's finding of
procedural bar if the state court addresses the merits along with the procedural bar. See
Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 258 (1989). Therefore, if this Court determines that the
district court correctly ruled that certain issues were procedurally barred, it should make
clear that it is affirming the procedural bar as an independently sufficient basis. If this
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district court then went on to rule in the alternative on the merits of the issues. It correctly
found that any irregularities in the arrest warrant or charging information were cured by the
subsequent valid conviction. In addition, it also held in the alternative that there was a valid
Parole Board arrest warrant.
1.

The district court correctly ruled that the issue
concerning the validity of the search warrant was
already decided on appeal.

Third District Court Commissioner Frances M. Palacios issued a search warrant. In
his petition, the petitioner argued that the Commissioner did not have jurisdiction to issue a
search warrant. However, this issue was already specifically raised and addressed on appeal.
Extraordinary relief is only available where "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is
available." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). Matters properly heard on appeal cannot be used as the
basis for granting an extraordinary writ. Jones v. Smith, 550 P.2d 194 (Utah 1976). Issues
already raised on appeal, or that could have been raised on appeal, are barred from collateral
attack. Andrews v. Morris. 607 P.2d 816 (Utah), cert.denied. 449 U.S. 891, 101 S.Ct 254,
66 L.Ed.2d 120 (1980); Wells v. Shulsen. 747 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1987); Jensen v. Deland. 795
P.2d 619 (Utah 1989). "Issues raised and disposed of on direct appeal of a conviction or a
sentence cannot properly be raised again in a Rule 65 B proceeding, Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d
1029,1036 (Utah 1989), and should be dismissed as an abuse of the writ without a ruling on

Court chooses, it may then go on to discuss the merits, but review of the merits should not
be intermingled with the basis for dismissal as procedurally barred.
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the merits." Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994), cert.denied, 64 USLW
3241, 116 S.Ct. 97(1995).10
Prior to trial, petitioner moved to suppress evidence obtained during a search.
Petitioner "argued that the issuance of a search warrant constitutes a fundamental court
function and thus the search and seizure were unconstitutional in that the court commissioner
who issued the search warrant lacked the authority to do so." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,
300 (Utah 1998) (addendum B). Petitioner's motion to suppress was denied. On appeal,
petitioner argued that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. The court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari
review of this issue.
The Utah Supreme Court said that "while issuing a search warrant does not rise to the
level of finality as entering judgment and imposing sentence, as was disallowed in Ohms, it
is sufficiently final to establish it as a core judicial function." Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304
(addendum B). The Supreme Court found that the court of appeals erred when it held that
Ohms did not apply and erred in upholding the trial court ruling denying petitioner's motion
to suppress. Id. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for a
determination as to whether the trial court's failure to suppress evidence obtained from the
search constituted reversible error. Id.

10

The Post-Conviction Remedies Act, (which came into effect in 1996), also
specifically precludes relief on any ground that was raised or addressed on appeal, or that
could have been raised on appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35 l-106(l)(b)(c).
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Upon remand, the court ofappeals affirmed petitioner's conviction in a memorandum
decision filed February 25,1999 (R. 1953-54) (addendum C). The court ofappeals held that
the trial court's failure to suppress evidence obtained from the search did not constitute
reversible error. The court noted that even if the evidence had been suppressed, the jury still
had before it:
a positive and unequivocal eyewitness identification from the store manager
who had spent several minutes studying defendant's face while in the store,
and had come face-to-face with the defendant several times while defendant
forced the manager across the store parking lot. A neighbor immediately nextdoor to the apartment at which defendant had been staying directed police to
the apartment. Upon arrival, the police were able to see defendant inside and
confirmed the neighbor's report that a man matching the description given by
the Kentucky Fried Chicken employees was there. The police guarded the
apartment until defendant emerged. Most importantly, defendant's voluntary
and uncoerced confession that he had committed the robbery was also before
the jury.
State v. Thomas. 1999 UT App 051 (unpublished) (R. 1953-54) (addendum C).
The court of appeals held that the "admission of the seized evidence was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt because 'the evidence that was erroneously admitted did not
significantly contribute to defendant's conviction and other properly admitted evidence
overwhelmingly established his guilt.'" Id., quoting State v. Genovesu 909 P.2d 916, 923
(Utah App. 1995).
Thus, the district court correctly found that the issue of whether Commissioner
Palacios had authority to sign the search warrant had already been decided. In addition, the
issue of whether the trial court's failure to suppress evidence obtained from the search had
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already been decided. Because these issues were already addressed on appeal, they were not
properly raised in the petition for extraordinary relief.
The district court properly concluded that petitioner was not entitled to extraordinary
relief upon his claim that the search warrant was invalid because that claim had already been
raised and addressed on appeal (addendum E, p. 2).
2.

The district court correctly ruled that petitioner's
challenges to the arrest warrant and the charging
information were not raised in the petition.

The district court correctly ruled that petitioner was not entitled to extraordinary relief
on his allegations concerning the arrest warrant and Information because these issues were
not raised in his petition. The petition (and the amended petition) did not set out in plain and
concise terms the facts or basis of these allegations, and did not set forth any reasons why
these claims would entitled petitioner to extraordinary relief (R. 1-6, 21-102, 121-182).
3.

The district court correctly ruled in the alternative
that petitioner's challenges to the arrest warrant and
the charging information were issues that could have
been raised on appeal.

Even though the district court ruled that the petitioner's challenges to the arrest
warrant and the charging information were not properly raised in the petition, the court went
on to find that petitioner was procedurally barred from raising these issues in his petition
because they could have been raised on appeal.
Although not apparent from his petition, from statements made by petitioner's counsel
in court, it appeared that petitioner was attempting to argue that the arrest warrant for the
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crime of aggravated robbery was invalid because it was signed by Commissioner Palacios.
Similarly, although not apparent in his petition, from statements made by petitioner's counsel
in court, it appeared that petitioner was also attempting to argue that the Information was
defective because it was signed by Commissioner Palacios.
The court correctly concluded that petitioner's challenges to the arrest warrant and the
charging information were issues that could have been raised on appeal. As argued above,
issues already raised on appeal, or that could have been raised on appeal, are barred from
collateral attack. "Issues that could and should have been raised on direct appeal, but were
not, may not properly be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding absent unusual circumstances."
Gardner v. Holden. 888 P.2d at 613. Petitioner did not allege or establish any unusual
circumstances or any reason why these issues were not or could not have been raised on
appeal. The district court correctly ruled that petitioner was not entitled to extraordinary
relief because his challenges to the arrest warrant and Information were issues that could
have been raised on appeal.
4.

The district court also correctly ruled in the
alternative that any irregularities in the arrest
warrant or charging information were cured by the
subsequent valid conviction.

In addition to the fact that petition was procedurally barred from raising these issues,
the district court correctly ruled that even if properly raised, petitioner would not be entitled
to relief on these issues because any irregularity in the arrest warrant or Information was
cured by the subsequent valid conviction.
18

Case law is clear that "an error at the preliminary state is cured if the defendant is later
convicted beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Ouas, 837 P.2d 565, 566-67 (Utah App.
1992). The United States Supreme Court has held that "illegal arrest or detention does not
void a subsequent conviction." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 95 S.Ct. 854 (1975).
Thus, "although a suspect who is presently detained may challenge the probable cause for
the confinement, a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant was
detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause." Id. at 119.
The Utah Supreme Court and the 10th Circuit have followed this rule. The Utah
Supreme Court has held that even if a probable cause statement was defective, such defect
did not warrant reversal of an otherwise valid conviction. State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264,
272 (Utah 1985); see also State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 808 (Utah App. 1988).
Similarly, "[i]f an indictment has been returned and the defendant is subsequently convicted,
the conviction will not be reversed for failure to hold the preliminary examination." United
States v. Aranda-Hernandez. 95 F.3d 977,979 (10th Cir. 1996).
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that "where the only possible prejudice to a
defendant was a brief period of detention prior to preliminary hearing, '[i]n light of the
subsequent conviction, that temporary period of possibly wrongful detention is of minimal
significance and does not warrant a reversal of an otherwise valid conviction.'" State v.
Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 393 (Utah 1986)(quoting Schreuder, 712 P.2d at 272).

19

Thus, the district court correctly ruled that petitioner was not entitled to extraordinary
relief because any irregularity in the arrest warrant or Information was cured by the
subsequent valid conviction.
5.

The district court correctly ruled in the alternative
that there was a valid arrest warrant as to parole
violations.

Petitioner alleged that he was arrested without an arrest warrant, and that he did not
thereafter receive an appropriate determination of probable cause within 48 hours. As
addressed above, petitioner was procedurally barred from raising this issue because it could
have been raised on appeal. In addition, any irregularities in the arrest or charging were
cured by the subsequent valid conviction. But even further, the district court also properly
held in the alternative that there was a valid Parole Board arrest warrant.
Petitioner was arrested on the charge of aggravated robbery without an arrest warrant.
However, at that time, there was already an outstanding warrant for petitioner's arrest for the
charges of probation violation (R. 1927). When petitioner was arrested, the booking
information shows that he was arrested and booked for probation violations, and for the new
charge of aggravated robbery (R. 1929). The State of Utah parole violation report states that
the petitioner was detained on the board of pardons warrant of arrest on July 1, 1993.
("DATE DETAINED ON BOP W/A: 7-1-93") (R. 1909). Petitioner was arrested pursuant
to an arrest warrant on his probation violation charges. Thus, petitioner was properly in
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custody regardless of who signed the July 6th arrest warrant for the charge of aggravated
robbery.
The United States Supreme Court has held that "the Fourth Amendment requires a
prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial
detention following a warrantless arrest." County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,
47, 111 S.Ct. 1661 (1991), citing Gerstein v. Pugh. 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d
54 (1975). The court went on to say that "a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations
of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the
promptness requirement." McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56.
Utah law provides that "[i]n order to detain any person arrested without a warrant, as
soon as is reasonably feasible but in no event longer than 48 hours after the arrest, a
determination shall be made as to whether there is probable cause to continue to detain the
arrestee." Utah R. J. Admin. 4-611(1). But this rule only applies to persons arrested without
a warrant. This rule did not apply to petitioner because there was an outstanding warrant for
his arrest on probation violations at the time of his arrest, and he was arrested and booked not
only for the new crime of aggravated robbery, but also for probation violations.
Petitioner was not the average citizen, arrested only for the suspected commission of
a crime. He was already on probation. "[Pjarolees have diminished Fourth Amendment
rights." State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1262 (Utah 1983). see also State v. Blackwell
809 P.2d 135 (Utah App. 1991).
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"It is abundantly clear that probationers 'do not enjoy "the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly
dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions."'"
State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525.529 (Utah APP. 1998)(quoting State v. Martinez. 811 P.2d205.
209 (Utah Ct.App.)(quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin. 483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164,3168,
97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)(citation omitted; alteration in original)), cert.denied. 815 P.2d 241
(Utah 1991).
The general rule that a judicial determination of probable cause should be made within
48 hours does not apply to persons already in the state's lawful custody. The requirements
of a probable cause hearing are not applicable to someone detained pursuant to a probation
hold. State v. Martinez. 198 Wis.2d 222, 234, 542 N.W.2d 215 (Wis.App. 1995). "[T]he
interval between an 'arrest' and an initial appearance is never unreasonable where the
arrested suspect is already in the lawful physical custody of the State." State v. Harris. 174
Wis.2d 367, 375, 497 N.W.2d 742 (Wis. App. 1993)
In this case, petitioner was already in the lawful physical custody of the State because
he was arrested for alleged probation violations. Thus, there was no issue over whether he
would be released on the new charge of aggravated robbery. Even if technically "released"
on the new aggravated robbery charge, petitioner would have remained in custody on the
probation violation charges. See Kelly. 718 P.2d at 393 (defendant would not have been
released prior to the preliminary hearing because of a parole violation).
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Thus, the District Court correctly ruled that petitioner was not entitled to any
extraordinary relief as to his probable cause claim because there was an outstanding warrant
for his arrest for probation violations and he was properly in custody for probation violations.
Therefore the rule requiring determination of probable cause within 48 hours did not apply.
In addition, petitioner was not entitled to relief because even if there were any problem with
the determination of probable cause, a valid conviction will not be vacated solely because the
defendant was detained prior to trial without a determination of probable cause. The district
court correctly ruled that there was a valid arrest warrant and petitioner's right to a
determination of probable cause within 48 hours was not violated.
B.

The district court properly dismissed the petition for extraordinary
relief because petitioner's complaints concerning the Board of
Pardons and Parole were either without merit or were
unreviewable by the district court.
1.

The district court correctly ruled that petitioner's
argument that the Parole Board's warrant was
invalid was without merit.

On June 18, 1993, the Utah State Board of Pardons issued an arrest warrant against
the petitioner for alleged probation violations (R. 1927). The warrant against petitioner
Thomas stated:
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to arrest the above-named parolee
and to cause him or her to be detained and returned to actual custody pending
a determination whether there is probably [sic] cause to believe that the
parolee has violated the conditions of his or her parole.
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(R. 1927). As addressed above, the district court properly found that the petitioner was in
custody because he was arrested for alleged parole violations.
Petitioner argued that the arrest warrant issued by the Board of Pardons was invalid
based on Salt Lake Citv v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994), and State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d
299, 302 (Utah 1998). However, these cases are not applicable to an arrest warrant issued
by the Board of Pardons. The Board of Pardons is not part of the judicial branch of
government. The person who makes the determination whether reasonable grounds exist for
revocation of parole "need not be a judicial officer. The granting and revocation of parole
are matters traditionally handled by administrative officers." Morrissev v. Brewer. 408 U.S.
471, 486, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972).
Revocation of parole is not even a criminal proceeding. "[T]he revocation of parole
is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in
such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations." Morrissev v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
480, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972). See also State v. Tate. 1999 UT App 302, ^10, 989 P.2d 73, 75
(UtahApp. 1999).
"A parole revocation proceeding is a civil proceeding that is entirely independent of
any related criminal proceeding, even if the criminal charges are based on the same facts as
those on which a charge of parole violation are based." Peterson v. Utah Board of Pardons.
907 P.2d 1148, 1154 (Utah 1995). "It is well established that parole revocation is civil,
rather than criminal, in nature." Johns v. Shulsen. 717 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986), citing
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Morrissey v. Brewer. 408 U.S. at 480. "[T]he revocation of parole is not part of a cnminal
prosecution and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in an ordinary criminal proceeding
does not apply in parole revocations." Garrett v. State, 768 S. W. 2d 943,945 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989). A "distinction should be drawn between the rights of a citizen who is merely accused
of a crime and the rights of a criminal who is under the force of the penal system." Id.
"[Probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled." State v.
Ham. 910 P.2d 433, 437-38 (Utah App. 1996) (citations omitted).
The Board of Pardons and Parole was specifically created by the Utah State
Constitution. Utah Const. Art. 7, § 12(1) (1953). The board has specific statutory authority
to issue warrants and to revoke parole. "The board may revoke the parole of any person who
is found to have violated any condition of his parole." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(1) and
see § 76-3-202. "Any member of the board may issue a warrant based upon a certified
warrant request to a peace officer or other persons authorized to arrest, detain, and return to
actual custody a parolee..." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(3).
Actions of the Board of Pardons are also governed by the Utah Administrative Code,
section R671-101 through 671 -508 (1993).11 "A member of the Board of Pardons may issue

11

Respondent refers to the applicable code sections in 1993, because the allegations of parole violations were raised in 1993. Since then, the code sections relating to
the Board of Pardons have been changed and amended several times and now consist of
rules R671-101 through 522.
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a warrant in compliance with the Board's rule on Evidence for Issuance of Warrants." Utah
Admin. Code § R671-511-1.
The board's statutorily authorized power to issue warrants is part of its constitutional
parole power, the exercise of which does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. See
Utah Const art 5, § 1; Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(3). See also In re Younz 976 P.2d 581,
584 (Utah 1999)12 (holding that even where one branch of government is "charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to" one of the other branches of government, and the
function given by the statute is one "appertaining to" another branch of government, if the
constitution expressly directs or permits the exercise of that function, there is no violation
of Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
The Board has the constitutional and statutory authority to issue warrants to "retake"
a parolee back into custody upon an allegation of a parole violation. In this case petitioner
was on parole. He was still under the supervisory control of the board of pardons. The board
properly exercised its administrative authority to return the petitioner to custody because of
allegations that he had violated the conditions of his parole. Petitioner was in custody

12

Speaking to a similar issue, in Padilla v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 947
P.2d 664, 668-69 (Utah 1997), the Court addressed whether the Board's power to make
parole determinations was essentially the power to sentence - an inherently judicial
power. The Court noted that "the Board's power itself is constitutionally derived." Id. at
668. The Court held that "the board merely exercises its constitutional authority to
commute or terminate an indeterminate sentence . . ." and the "Board's exercise of that
parole power in setting determinate parole dates does not violate the separation of powers
doctrine of article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution." Id. at 669.
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because of the valid "retaking" warrant which was properly issued by the Board of Pardons.
The District Court correctly ruled that petitioner's argument that the Parole Board's warrant
was invalid based on Ohms and Thomas was without merit.
2.

The district court correctly ruled that petitioner
waived his right to a prerevocation hearing.

Petitioner raised an argument concerning the timeliness of his probation revocation
hearing. The district court correctly ruled that petitioner's argument was without merit
because he had specifically waived his right to a prerevocation hearing.
Petitioner was arrested on July 1, 1993. On July 7,1993, he was provided with a copy
of the Prerevocation Hearing Information (R. 1933-35). This form included the charges
against him and information concerning his rights, including his right to a prerevocation
hearing. It advised the petitioner as follows:
In order for you to be held in custody on a Board Warrant, probable
cause must be established that you have violated the conditions of your parole.
If a preliminary hearing in a circuit court has been or will be held on
these charges and you are bound over for trial, probable cause to believe that
you have violated the conditions of your parole has already been established
and you do not have a right to a Prerevocation Hearing.
If a preliminary hearing on these charges has not been held or you were
not bound over for trial, you may choose to have a Prerevocation Hearing
based on the following procedure:
* * *

You may waive you [sic] right to a Prerevocation Hearing. If you make
this choice, you will be returned to prison for a full Revocation hearing by the
Board of Pardons. The Board will determine whether you have violated your
conditions of parole and whether your parole should be revoked.
(R. 1933-35).

27

Under Utah Admin. Code § R671-503, a prerevocation hearing should be conducted
within fourteen days after detention on a Board warrant unless such hearing is expressly
waived by the parolee. The purpose of the prerevocation hearing is to "determine whether
there is probable cause to believe that the parolee is in violation of his parole agreement."
Utah Admin. Code § R671-503-1.
On July 7, 1993, petitioner signed the Prerevocation Hearing Information form,
waiving his right to a prerevocation hearing (R. 1935). Thus, the district court correctly
found that the petitioner had specifically waived his right to a prerevocation hearing by
signing the waiver of prerevocation hearing form.
3.

The district court correctly ruled that it would not
review a decision by the Board of Pardons refusing to
grant a prisoner credit for time served.

The district court correctly ruled that a decision by the Board of Pardons refusing to
grant a prisoner credit for time served is within the discretion of the Board. The District
Court correctly determined that it would not review that decision.
Case law in Utah has clearly held that "it is not a violation of fundamental fairness for
the Board of Pardons to not give an inmate credit against his prison sentence for time served
as a condition of probation;' Rawling v. Holden. 869 P.2d 958, 962 (Utah App. 1994), see
also Ontiveros v. Utah Board of Pardons. 897 P.2d 1222, 1223 (Utah App. 1995).
In addition, "[djecisions of the board in cases involving paroles, pardons,
commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are
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final and are not subject to judicial review." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3). "[T]he
Legislature has specifically barred appeals from Board of Pardons orders." Peterson v. Utah
Board of Pardons. 907 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1995).
Therefore the district court correctly ruled that it would not review a decision by the
Board of Pardons refusing to grant petitioner credit for time served.
C.

The district court correctly ruled that the petitioner was not
entitled to relief based on allegations concerning his request for 120
day disposition.
1.

The district court correctly ruled that the allegations
concerning the request for 120 disposition were not
raised in the original or amended petition.

For the first time, in his reply to the respondent's motion to dismiss, the petitioner
raised a totally new issue which was not raised or addressed anywhere in his original petition
or his amended petition for extraordinary relief. Petitioner argued that he was entitled to
relief because he was not brought to trial within 120 days from the date of his demand for
disposition. The district court correctly found that petitioner was not entitled to relief
because allegations concerning the request for 120 disposition were not raised in the original
or amended petition.
2.

The district court correctly ruled in the alternative
that the allegations concerning 120 day disposition
could have been raised on appeal.

In addition to the fact that this issue was not raised in the petition, the district court
also correctly ruled that petitioner was not entitled to relief on this issue because it was an

29

issue which could have been raised and addressed on appeal. As argued above, extraordinary relief is only available where "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is
available". Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). Issues already raised on appeal, or that could have been
raised on appeal, are barred from collateral attack. Andrews v. Morris. 607 P.2d 816 (Utah),
cert.denied. 449 U.S. 891,101 S.Ct. 254,66 L.Ed.2d 120 (1980); Wells v. Shulsen. 747 P.2d
1043 (Utah 1987); Jensen v. Deland, 795 P.2d 619 (Utah 1989).
The issue concerning 120 day disposition could have been raised on appeal, but was
not. Because this issue could have been raised on appeal, the District Court correctly ruled
that petitioner was procedurally barred from raising it in his petition for extraordinary relief.
3,

The district court also correctly ruled in the
alternative that petitioner was not entitled to relief
because the delay in bringing petitioner to trial was
largely of his own making.

In addition to the fact that the petitioner was procedurally barred from raising this
issue, the district court also correctly ruled in the alternative that the petitioner was not
entitled to relief because his own actions were the cause of the trial delay. The 120 day rule
allows a prisoner to make a written demand to have the charge against him brought to trial
within 120 days of the date of delivery of his written demand. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1)
and See State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d421 (Utah 1991). However, the rule also provides that:
After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
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In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 davs, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time
required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) and (4) (emphasis added).
In this case, there was clearly good cause for the delay. A review of the file and the
court docket shows that petitioner filed numerous motions for new counsel, and changed
counsel at least eight (8) times (addendum G). The court informed the petitioner that each
time he fired another attorney, that time was stayed on his 120 day detainer.13 In addition,
the petitioner requested continuances, waived speedy trial and specifically waived the 120
day disposition (addendum G).
Utah case law is clear that when the defendant himself causes the delay, he is not
entitled to the protection of the 120 day rule. "[W]hen a prisoner himself acts to delay the
trial, he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive his right to a speedy trial. Thus, the
disposition period must be extended by the amount of time during which the prisoner himself
creates the delay." State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911,916 (Utah 1998).
In State v. Phathammavong. 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 1993), the defendant had
requested continuances, changed counsel, and agreed to postpone the trial. The court found

13

Petitioner also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations
had run and he was not afforded a speedy trial. The Court denied that motion (R. 2258).
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that "when defendant requested these continuances, he temporarily waived his right to a
speedy trial." Id. at 1004-05. "When the prisoner himself acts to delay trial on such charges,
he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive this protection..." State v. Velasquez, 641
P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982). "[Although the right to a speedy trial is of paramount
importance in a criminal case, a defendant who initiates delay is not in a position to demand
adherence to a statutory time limit." State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 552 (Utah 1991)
(citations omitted). See also State v. Maestas. 815 P.2d 1319 (Utah App. 1991); State v.
Stillings. 709 P.2d 348 (Utah 1985).
In this case, petitioner clearly caused the delays himself. He changed counsel
numerous times, he requested continuances, and he specifically waived his right to speedy
trial on the record. Thus, there was good cause for the delay, and the District Court correctly
ruled that the petitioner was not entitled to any extraordinary relief based on the fact that his
trial was not actually held within 120 days of his demand notice, because the delay was
largely of his own making.
D.

The trial court had jurisdiction.

Petitioner attempts to assert that the trial court lacked proper jurisdiction over him.
Petitioner was charged with the felony of aggravated robbery, alleged to have occurred in
Salt Lake County. The district court therefore had proper jurisdiction over petitioner for this
offense. None of petitioner's other allegations change the fact that the district court had
proper jurisdiction.

32

Petitioner also alleged that he did not receive a preliminary examination within ten
(10) days of his arrest, and that this somehow deprived the court ofjurisdiction. Rule 7(g)(2)
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, states that if a defendant does not waive the
preliminary examination, the magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. It also
provides that the time period for holding a preliminary hearing may be extended for good
cause shown. Rule 7(g) Utah R. Crim. P.
In this case, the information against the petitioner was filed on July 6, 1993. The
preliminary hearing was originally scheduled for July 13,1993 (R. 2241). The district court
found that the preliminary hearing was then rescheduled and continued numerous times at
the request of petitioner and petitioner's counsel due to numerous changes in petitioner's
counsel and for other reasons (addendum E, p. 5). In addition, the petitioner expressed a
desire to waive his preliminary hearing. However, the court proceeded with the preliminary
hearing on December 14, 1993 (R. 2248-50).
Petitioner appeared to be claiming that a preliminary hearing was never held, but this
is simply not accurate. The preliminary hearing was held on December 14,1993. Witnesses
were called, the petitioner was advised of his rights and a plea of not guilty was entered. The
petitioner was then bound over to District Court (R. 2251).
The district court correctly found that the petitioner had not established that his
preliminary hearing was not continued for good cause. Dismissal is not required where, in
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the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that continuances were granted based
on what the court determined to be good cause.14
Petitioner also appeared to be arguing that he was not lawfully bound over, because
the bindover was done by a circuit court judge. The district court properly ruled that this
argument was meritless. In State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991), the magistrate
who performed the bindover "also happened to be a circuit court judge (as is true in most
cases)" Id. at 467. "These individuals, [circuit court judges] when sitting as magistrates have
the jurisdiction and powers conferred by law upon magistrates and not those that pertain to
their respective judicial offices." Id. (citations omitted). Thus, a circuit court judge clearly
had the authority to act as a magistrate to perform the preliminary hearing and issue a
bindover order.
In this case, a preliminary hearing was held and the petitioner was properly bound
over to district court. The district court correctly found that the trial court had proper
jurisdiction to proceed with the case.
E.

The district court properly dismissed the petition without holding
oral argument on the merits.

The district court correctly ruled that there were no factual issues in dispute
(addendum D, p. 2). The court therefore properly ruled on the case as a matter of law

14

In addition, the petitioner would not have been released prior to the preliminary
hearing anyway because of the alleged parole violations. See State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385
(1986).
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without holding any evidentiary hearing or oral arguments concerning the merits of the
issues.
The rule governing extraordinary petitions does not require an evidentiary hearing or
oral argument in every case. The rule provides that "[a]fter pleadings are closed, the court
shall promptly set the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case." Utah R.
Civ. P. 65B(b)(10) (1995). Thus, it is clear that the court may set a hearing, or may
"otherwise dispose of the case." Id. In this case, a hearing was not necessary. The court
properly disposed of the case by ruling on the legal issues.
In addition, petitioner appears to be complaining that he was not actually brought to
court. The petitioner's presence is not required for the court to make its decision. The rule
simply provides that "[t]he petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the proceeding." Utah
R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(10) (1995). Because the district court resolved the matter on the pleadings
and motions without oral argument, there was no hearing on any dispositive issue.
Therefore, it was not necessary for the petitioner to be present.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm the Order of the district
court which dismissed the petition for extraordinary relief with prejudice.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

1% day of October, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL

ERIN RILEY
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
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Addenda

Addendum A

ADDENDUM A
(Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (1995) - Extraordinary relief)

Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief.
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief
on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving other types of wrongful restraint on personal
liberty), paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate authority) or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and
the failure to exercise such authority). There shall be no special form of writ.
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The procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by
the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules,
(b) Wrongful imprisonment
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state
prison, other correctional facility or county jail who asserts that the commitment resulted from a substantial denial of rights may petition the
court for relief under this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall govern
proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and commitments for violation of probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not
govern proceedings based on claims relating to the terms or conditions of
confinement
(2) Commencement Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition, together
with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the district court in the county in
which the commitment leading to confinement was issued. The court may
order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the
parties or witnesses. Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings
shall be commenced by filing a petition together with a copy thereof, with
the clerk of the district court in the county in which the petitioner is
located.
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims
that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the commitment.
Additional claims relating to the legality of the commitment may not be
raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition shall state:
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained;
(B) the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted
and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction
was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
(C) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis of which
the petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as the result of
the commitment;
(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment
for violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and,
if so, the number and caption or title of the appellate proceeding and
the results of the review;
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already been a b dicated in any prior poet-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding.
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the
petition affidavits, copies of records or other evidence available to the
petitioner in support of the allegations. The petitioner shall also attach to
the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior
post-conviction or other civil proceeding that abjudicated the legality of
the commitment, and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If
copies of pertir.^*; pieacungs, orders, and memoranda are not attached,
the petition shall state why they are not attached.
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed
with the petition.
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the petition,
the clerk shall promptly deliver it to the assigned judge of the court in
which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the
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presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding to the judge who
issued the commitment.
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is
apparent to the court that the issues presented in the petition have already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason
any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is
frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner.
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of
dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court
shall designate the portion* of uie petition that are not frivolous and
direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney.
(9) Responsive pleading* Within twenty days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition
upon the attorney general and county attorney, or within such other
period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or county
attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days
(plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set
the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. Upon motion
for good cause, the court may grant leave to either party to take discovery
or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the court may
order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant
transcript or court records. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so aa to delay unreasonably the
hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall be present
before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise
be present in court during the proceeding.
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter
an appropriate order with respect to the validity of the challenged commitment and with respect to rearraignment, retrial, resentencing, custody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any
hearing on a dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general
or the county attorney, or upon its own motion, the court may stay release
of the petitioner pending appeal of its order.
(12) Costa. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the
petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the petitioner may
proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the court may
direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was
originally charged.
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition
may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those
courts.
(c) Other wrongful restraints on personal liberty.
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of this rule,
this paragraph (c) shall govern all r:t;t::ns C!? ; T.?-~ *u~* - p::::r. hzs
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been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court may grant
relief appropriate under this paragraph.
(2) Commencement The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a
petition with the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner
is restrained or the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is
occurring.
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall
contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the
petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place
where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the
restraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the tegality of
the restraint has already been abjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so,
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. The petitioner
shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the petitioner
that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a
copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that
adjudicated the legality of the restraint
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed
with the petition.
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is
apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been
adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in
the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on
its face and the reasons for this conclusion. The order need not state
findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be sent by mail to
the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of
the order of dismissal.
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being
frivolous on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a
copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent
by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order directing the
respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a
time within which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the restraint An
answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has restrained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person
so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so, the
identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or
authority for the transfer. Nothing in paragraph (c) shall be construed to
prohibit the court from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive
motion*
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be re*
strained will be removedfromthe court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the
court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent
before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of the petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been
restrained in the custody of such other persons as may be appropriate.
(6) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent cannot be found, or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has
custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any
other process issued by the court may be served on the person having
custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been
named as respondent in the action.
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(9) Avoidance of service by respondent If anyone having custody of
the person alleged to be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or
attempts wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction,
the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff
shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with
according to law.
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and
shall render judgment accordingly. The respondent or other person having custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall
state the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct
the respondent to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the
petitioner waives the right to be present at the hearing, the court shall
modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall not be
disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the
petition, if enough is stated to impart the meaning and intent of the
proceeding to the respondent.
(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority.
(1) Who may petition the court: security. The attorney general may,
and when directed to do so by the governor shall, petition the court for
relief on the grounds enumerated in this paragraph (d). Any person who
is not required to be represented by the attorney general and who is
aggrieved or threatened by one of the acta enumerated in subparagraph
(2) of this paragraph (d) may petition the court under this paragraph (d) if
(A) the person claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by
a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be
brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for
costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided
for in Rule 73.
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a
person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation
created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer
does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where
persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally
incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated the laws of the state
of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or
(E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights,
privileges or franchisee.
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to
appear at the hearing on the merita. The court may also grant temporary
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A.
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty.
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may
petition the court for relief.
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed
to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or
(C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person
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HAS reftiaed tht petitioner ths use or enjoyment of a right or office to
which ths petitioner ia entitled
(3) Proceedings on tht petition. On ths filing of a petition, ths court
may require that notice bs given to advent parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issus a hearing order requiring ths advent party to
appear at tht hearing on tht merits. Tht court may direct tht inferior
court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other ptnon named
as respondent to dsliver to tht court a transcript or othtr record of tht
proceedings. Tht court may also grant temporary relief in accordance
with tht terms of Rult 65A.
(4) Scopt of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in
nature, the courts review shall not extend furthtr than to determine
whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority.
(Amended effective September 1, 1991; May I, 1993) *
Advisor? Commit*** Noes. — This nils
represent* a complete reorganixation of ths former nils. This nils also revises parts of ths
former rule dealing with habeas corpus tat!
post-coavtction remedies. The rule applies «-***•
trslly ts prncoorllnp that are aocociitifod by
the absence of aaother plain, woody and ads*
qvisis remedy in ths court After ths ruis's introductory parsers**, each subsequent persgrip* is intended ts dssi with a ospsrsis type
of proct«dtaf. Thus. subparagraph (b> deals
wick pnroodinp involving wroaaftii impci*os>
moat; subparagraph (e) deals with pronoodinp
involving othor typos of wrongful restraint oe
personal liberty; psrserapa K4) dsals with pro*
rcodirtp iavoiviae ths wrongtai use of public
or corporats authority sad paragraph (e> deals
with proroodinp involving ths wrongful u*» of
judicial authority or ths failure ts tiaras*
such authority. To ths sxtsat that ths tpscisi
proosduras sat forth in thass paragraphs do not
cover epodfte prosadursi issues thst arias dss>
ine a proceeding, th* normal rulss of dvil pro*
csduie will apply.
This mis aflsatheiy oHnrinafs ths <
of ths "writ" from extraordinary relief prcccdura. la ths visor of ths advisory rranmitto*,
ths coaeapt was used inesconeosetiy end
confusingly in ths (brmer rule, aad thsrs wss

frivolous claim* before any answer or othor responsive pioodiaf is required. This provision is
patterned after th* federal practice pursuant to
18 V S.C. I 2254. Third, the attorney pnersi
or county attorney must m* a responsive
pisediag only after ths court has concluded
that ail or part of ths petition is not frivolous
on its face and has directed the dork to serve a
copy of the petition. The advisory committee
adopted the summary procedures est forth ia
paraaraph (b) as a mesas of balancing the requirement* of tslrness and due process oa ths
oas head against ths public's interest ia ths
efficient eeftdkatioa of ths enormous volume
of wrongful imprisonment eases pending in th*

what it meant in actual pretties, Ths <
has bssa replaced with tsrma such as "fceenag
order" aad VeUsT than are a w e dsssripthe of
the proteduisi reality.
Piraaraoh fb>. This parssrsph replace* #ubWorths mrmar ruts. It i

fa) is patterned after th* former rule,
Paragraphs id) aad is) replace paragraph (b)
of tho former mis. Ths commit***'! general
purpose ia drafting these paragraphs wss ts
sunpiiry and clarify *he requirements of the

men* rofsrdless whothsr th* d*im rtlatas to
vioUttoa of probstisa or pernio, bus this parm»
graph doss not govern prooosdinp bsssd upoa
claims relating ts ths terms or rrmditinns of
confinement Claims futatiag » ths tsrms or
conditions of confinement ars ptaraad by eue>
paragraph (a of ths rule. Paragraph \bu as s
general matter, umpliflos ths plesding requiromsats in wrongful imprisonment caaas
and contains thras significant changoa from
procsdui* under ths former nil*, first, th*
psrseraph requires tho printing judp to as*
sign wrongful imprisonm*nt casas "if possibl*"
to tho judge who issued th* eommitmoat ordsr.
9*eomi th* rul* allows ths court to

Paraaraim (*>. Tuts paragraph governs all
P«UUWUA claiming that a person has been
wrongfully leotnined of personal liberty other
than those specifically governed by psraarsph
<i». It replaces psrseraph (0 of thoformernil*.
seraph (b) of the presses rul* para(c) sndssvon ts simplify ths procedure
ia assess corpus esses and provides for s
of summary dismissal of frivolous
claims. Thus, if it is apparent to tho court thst
ths daim is "frivolous oa its fece", tho court
mayumojsaa ordsr dismissing ths daim, which
tsrminstes th* proceeding. Apartfromthia sig»

Paparooh (di Parseraph (d) replaoss paragraph 'b^pofthe former rule. Thia paragraph
deals generally with proroodinp far the unlawful uss of public office or corporate frss>
chisas* As a general matter, th* attorney general may seek relief oa grounds enumerated ia
the paragraph. Aay other porssa, includine s
governmental officer or entity not required to
bo lepresemsd by tho attorney general nsy
also seek relief under paragraph (d) if tho person claims to bo entitled to aa office unlawfully
held by another or if th* attorney pnersi foils
to Mis a petition under paragraph (d) after recstvtne notice of the person's daim. In allowing
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(Cite as: 961 P.2d 299)
Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Richard Dee THOMAS, Defendant and Petitioner.
No. 970049.
May 22, 1998.
Defendant was convicted in the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, William B. Bohling, J., of
aggravated robbery. The Court of Appeals affirmed
and certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court,
Russon, J., held that: (1) court commissioner could
not constitutionally issue search warrant given that
issuing search warrant was core judicial function
involving ultimate judicial power, and (2) defendant
inadequately briefed photo array issue.

commissioner is valid under de facto doctrine,
except that present defendant would be given benefit
of his victory, in making his constitutional
challenge. Const. An. 8, § i; U.C.A.1953,
78-3-31, 78-3-3l(6)(a).
[5] Court Commissioners <3=»3
Holding in Ohms prohibiting court commissioners
from performing core judicial functions did not
deinstitutionalize court commissioners given that
court commissioners are still able to perform many
important functions in assistance to courts such as
conducting fact finding hearings, holding pretrial
conferences, and making other recommendations to
judges. Const. An. 8, § 1; U.C.A.1953, 78-3-31.
[6] Coun Commissioners <©^3

On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews Court of
Appeals' decision for correctness and gives its
conclusions of law no deference.

Issuance of search warrant is core judicial function,
which court commissioners lack authority to
perform, though statute purports to give such
authority to magistrates, which term includes
commissioners, given that issuing search warrant
could not be characterized as permissible functions
of commissioner of either recommendation to judge
or other action reviewable by judge, and, when
judge issues law enforcement order to search and
seize, judge simultaneously exercises power and
authority to enforce such order, and once armed
with issued warrant, law enforcement proceeds to
search and seize at will. Const. An. 8, § 1;
U.C. A. 1953,
77-1-3,
77-23-201,
78-3-31,
78-3-3 l(6Xa).

[3] Officers and Public Employees <S=*43

[7] Coun Commissioners <®^3

Under doctrine of "de facto authority/ actions
performed by those without actual authority are
validated when they are performed by one who,
under the color of law, assumes to exercise official
authority, is reputed to have it, and the community
acquiesces accordingly.

Core judicial functions can be performed only by
duly appointed judges, and not by coun
commissioners, and thus, only duly appointed judges
can issue search warrants. Const. An. 8, § 1.

[4] Court Commissioners Qz*3

Due to defendant's lack of analysis, issue of whether
trial coun erred in denying his motion to suppress a
positive eyewitness identification made from suspect
photo array was inadequately briefed, and thus,
Coun of Appeals was justified in declining to
address it. Rules App.Proc., Rule 24(a)(9).

Reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded.
West Headnoces
[1] Certiorari <®=»63.1
On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews decision of
Court of Appeals, not decision of trial court.
[2] Certiorari <®=»64<1)

[4] Courts <S=* 100(1)
Instant decision, holding that court commissioner
does not have authority to issue search warrant, is
prospective, and any prior search warrant issued by

[8] Criminal Law «=» 1130(5)
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[9] Criminal Law <®=* 1130(5)
Reviewing court will not address arguments that are
not adequately briefed.
Rules App.Proc., Rule
24(a)(9).
[10] Criminal Law <®=> 1130(5)
While failure to cite to pertinent authority may not
always render an issue inadequately briefed, it does
so when the overall analysis of the issue is so
tacking as to shift the burden of research and
argument to the reviewing court. Rules App.Proc.,
Rule 24(a)(9).
*300 Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Joanne C. Slotnik,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Bel-Ami Demontreux,
Defendant and Petitioner.

Salt

Lake

City,

for

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
RUSSON, Justice:
We granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of
Appeals' decision that our holding in Salt Lake City
v. Ohms, 881 P 2d 844 (Utah 1994) (prohibiting
court commissioners from performing core judicial
functions), does not apply to the issuance of a search
warrant by a court commissioner.
We are also
asked to review the court of appeals' refusal to
address defendant's claim that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress a positive eyewitness
identification made from a suspect photo array.
The court of appeals' refusal was based upon
inadequate briefing.
State v. Thomas, No.
960170-CA, slip op. (Ct.App. November 29, 1996)
(memorandum decision), cert, granted, 937 P.2d
136 (Utah 1997). We reverse as to the applicability
of Ohms and affirm as to the refusal to address the
photo array issue.

scene and began their investigation of the robbery.
As pan of their investigation, they received a lead
on a suspect who was reported to be in a nearby
apartment. The suspect was defendant Richard Dee
Thomas. When the police arrived at the apartment,
a confrontation ensued with Thomas. The officers
forced entry into the apartment but retreated after
Thomas threatened to kill a hostage. [FN1] Then.
while some officers guarded the apartment, others
went to obtain a search warrant.
FN I. It later turned out that there was no hostage.
During the early morning of July 1, 1993, Third
District Court Commissioner Frances M. Palacios
issued a search warrant. After obtaining the search
warrant, the police officers returned to the scene.
Shortly thereafter, Thomas surrendered, and the
apartment was searched.
During the search, the
police seized evidence linking Thomas to the crime.
On July 2, 1993, the manager of the restaurant was
shown a photo array of six men and identified
Thomas as the man who committed the robbery.
During interrogation and after Thomas waived his
Miranda rights, Thomas confessed to committing the
armed robbery. On July 6, 1993, the State filed an
information against Thomas, charging him with
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. Thomas
pleaded not guilty.

FACTS

Prior to trial, Thomas moved to suppress evidence
obtained during the search. Thomas cited Salt Lake
City v. Ohms and argued that the issuance of a
search warrant constitutes a fundamental court
function and thus the search and seizure were
unconstitutional in that the court commissioner who
issued the search warrant lacked the authority to do
so. This motion was denied. Thomas also moved to
suppress eyewitness identification, arguing, inter
alia, that the photo array of the six men was unduly
suggestive.
This motion was also denied.
On
August 4, 199S, a jury convicted Thomas as
charged.

On the night of June 30, 1993, an armed robbery
was committed at a fast food restaurant in Salt Lake
County, Utah. At gun point, the assailant ordered
the manager to put all the money into a bag and to
accompany him to the parking lot. The manager
was then released, and the assailant ran away.
Shortly thereafter, police officers arrived on the

On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Thomas
asserted, inter alia, that the trial conn erred when it
denied Thomas's motion *301 to suppress evidence
and his motion to suppress eyewitness identification.
In an unpublished memorandum decision, the court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings.
Thomas then petitioned this court for certiorari
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review, and we granted the petition.
ANALYSIS
[t][2J "On certiorari, we review the decision of the
coun of appeals, not the decision of the trial court."
State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995).
"We review the coun of appeals' decision for
correctness and give its conclusions of law no
deference." Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944
P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997).
I
The first issue we address is whether the court of
appeals erred when it held that Salt Lake City v.
Ohms, 881 P 2d 844 (Utah 1994), did not apply to
the issuance of a search warrant. Before the court
of appeals, Thomas argued that coun commissioners
do not have the authority to issue search warrants.
In a rather scant summary disposition of the issue,
the coun of appeals disagreed, simply stating:
Thomas relies on Salt Lake City v. Ohms for the
proposition that "the Utah Supreme Court, on
August 18, 1994, held that Utah Code Annotated §
78-3-31 (1992), that gave to Utah coun
commissioners their powers was unconstitutional.'
In addition to having prospective application,
Thomas's reading of Ohms is too broad and does
not apply to the issuance of a search warrant.
Thomas, slip op. at 1 (citation omitted).
Although the coun of appeals should have
elaborated to make its ruling more clear, die essence
of its holding appears' to be that (1) Ohms had
prospective
application and therefore
was
inapplicable to Thomas's case because die search
warrant pre-dated our ruling in Ohms;
(2)
Thomas's assenion that coun commissioners have
no power was too broad a reading of Ohms since
only the exercise of core judicial functions by coun
commissions was prohibited; and (3) Ohms did not
apply because die issuance of a search warrant is not
a core judicial (unction. We address these holdings
in turn.
[3] In Ohms, Ohms had been charged with giving
false or misleading information to a police officer, a
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City
Ordinance § 11.04.100. Ohms was tried, convicted,
and sentenced by a coun commissioner pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-3l(6)(a) (1992). [FN2]

Ohms appealed to this coun, arguing that a coun
commissioner did not have the authority to enter a
final judgment of conviction and impose sentence, as
such was an unconstitutional exercise of ultimate
judicial power.
We agreed and held that coun
commissioners cannot exercise a judge's ultimate
judicial power or, in other words, cannot perform
core judicial functions.
In so holding, we found
significant the fact that "[cjoun commissioners are
employees of the judiciary, not duly appointed
judges," and that commissioners are not subject to
the "constitutional checks and balances'* to which
duly appointed judges are subject. Ohms, 881 P.2d
at 851.
We thus found section 78-3-3 i(6)(a)
unconstitutional because it delegated the core
judicial functions of entering final judgment and
imposing sentence to a coun commissioner. Under
the doctrine of de facto authority, [FN3] we
validated die past actions of coun commissioners
who had engaged in die unconstitutional exercise of
core judicial functions.
FN2. Utah Code Aim. § 78-3-3 l(6)(a) (1992)
stated:
The coun commissioner may accept pleas of guilty
or no contest, impose sentence, and enter final
judgment in misdemeanor cases.
Upon the
informed consent of the defendant, the coun
commissioner may conduct a jury or nonjury
misdemeanor trial in accordance with the law.
Upon conviction, the commissioner may impose
sentence and enter final judgment. The judgment
entered by the commissioner shall be the final
judgment of the coun for all purposes, including
appeal.
FN3. Under this doctrine, actions performed by
those without actual authority are validated when
they are performed by one who, under the color of
law, " assumes to exercise official authority, is
reputed to have it, and the community acquiesces
accordingly/ " Ohms, 881 P.2d at 854 (quoting
Hussey v. Smith, 99 U.S. 20, 24, 25 L.Ed. 314
(1878)).
•302 A. Prospective Application
[4] Given only die coun of appeals' conclusive
statement, we assume that it agreed with die State's
argument that Thomas was precluded from
challenging commissioner actions because we
limited Ohms to prospective application and the
search warrant was issued some founeen months
prior to Ohms. Indeed, a review of the record
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reveals that the search warrant was issued on July i,
1993, over thirteen months prior to the Ohms
decision. However, while we stated in Ohms that
"actions taken by commissioners in the past are not
subject to challenge since court commissioners in
those cases acted with de facto authority/ we
declined to apply the de facto doctrine to Ohms as
he had "sustained the burden of attacking an
unconstitutional statute."
To hold otherwise and
deprive an appellant of "the fruits of victory" would
have the effect of "discouraging challenges to
statutes of questionable validity." Ohms, 881 P.2d
at 854-35. In the case before us, by arguing that
the issuance of a search warrant is a core judicial
function, Thomas, like Ohms, is attacking the
constitutionality of a court commissioner's exercise
of power. Thus, if Thomas sustains this burden,
and we hold that he does, then the de facto doctrine
would not apply to him for the same reasons it did
not apply to Ohms. As in Ohms, our decision today
is prospective, and any search warrants issued by
court commissioners in the past are valid, as they
were issued with de facto authority. Id.
B. The Power of Court Commissioners
[5] Thomas argued before the court of appeals that
our decision in Ohms held section 78-3-31
unconstitutional and thus "deconstitutionalized court
commissioners." The court of appeals dismissed
this argument as going beyond what was actually
held in Ohms. The court of appeals is correct. In
Ohms, we clearly stated that section 78-3-31
violated the Utah Constitution "to the extent that it
purports to vest ultimate judicial power of courts of
record in persons who have not been duly appointed
as article VIII judges." Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
We also acknowledged that court commissioners
"may perform many important functions in
assistance to courts" such as conducting fact finding
hearings, holding pretrial conferences, and making
other recommendations to judges.
In fact, we
specifically stated that "our decision in no way
affects the authority and functions that court
commissioners have enjoyed for over thirty years
and will undoubtedly continue to enjoy in the
future." Id. at 851-52 n. 17. Nowhere in Ohms did
we " deinstitutionalize" the court commissioner
system.
C. Issuance of a Search Warrant as a Core Judicial
Function
Copr. © West 2000 No Claim

Page 4

The court of appeals also held that Ohms did not
apply because the issuance of a search warrant is not
a core judicial function. This is a question of first
impression.
In Ohms, we stated that core judicial functions
include (I) " 'the power to hear and determine
controversies between adverse parties and questions
in litigation,' " (2) " 'the authority to hear and
determine justiciable controversies,' " (3) " the
authority to enforce any valid judgment, decree or
order,' " and (4) "all powers that are necessary to
protect die fundamental integrity of the judicial
branch.' " Id. at 849 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
Core judicial functions do not include
functions that are generally designed to "assist"
courts, such as conducting fact finding hearings,
holding
pretrial
conferences,
and making
recommendations to judges. In these instances, the
commissioners' actions are reviewable by adjudge;
thus, ultimate judicial power remains with the judge.
Id. at 85 In. 17.
[6] Turning to the present case, it is well
established that a search warrant is an order. See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-201 (1995) (defining
search warrant as "an order issued by a magistrate
in die name of the state and directed to a peace
officer," describing the search and property to be
seized); 1933 Revised Statutes of Utah § 105-54-1
(stating that "[a] search warrant is an order in
writing, in the name of the state, signed by a
magistrate and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property
and bring it before die magistrate"), quoted in Allen
v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P.2d 242, 247-48
(1943); see also 79 *303 C.J.S. Searches and
Seizures § 128 (1995). When a judge issues to law
enforcement an order to search and seize, the judge
simultaneously exercises die power and authority to
enforce such an order, because once armed with an
issued warrant, law enforcement proceeds to search
and seize at will. Thus, because a search warrant is
an order and die issuer possesses the authority to
enforce the order, die issuance of a search warrant
is a core judicial function, which commissioners
lack the authority to perform.
This holding is buttressed by the fact that the right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
embodied in the Utah and United States
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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Constitutions [FN4J is one of the most fundamental
and cherished rights we possess.
See, e.g.,
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758, 105 S.Ct.
1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985) (The Fourth
Amendment protects ... 'the right to be let alonethe most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.* " (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72
L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)));
Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87
S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) ("The Fourth
Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right
of the people which is basic to a free society.' "
(quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69
S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949))); Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 9i
L.Ed. 1399 (1947) ("This Court has consistently
asserted that the rights of privacy and personal
security protected by the Fourth Amendment'... are
to be regarded as of the very essence of
constitutional liberty; and that the guaranty of them
is as important and as imperative as are the
guaranties of the other fundamental rights of the
individual citizen ....' " (quoting Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 304. 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed.
647 (1921))), overruled in part by Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23
L.Ed.2d 683 (1969). Given the magnitude of the
right at risk when a search warrant is issued, we
have no difficulty in granting the issuance of a
search warrant core function status.
FN4. The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which is practically identical to
article I. section" 14 of the Utah Constitution,
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shaU not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oadi or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized,
[7] The State proffers two arguments as to why
court commissioners have the authority to issue
search warrants.
First, the Stale claims that
commissioner authority to issue search warrants
stems from their status as magistrates, who possess
the clear statutory grant of power to issue search
warrants. Section 77-1-3 does define a magistrate as
"a justice or judge of a court of record or not of
record or a commissioner of such a court appointed
Copr. O West 2000 No Claim
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in accordance with Section 78-3-31/ and section
78-7-l7.5(l)(c) does vest authority in magistrates to
"issue ... warrants of search."
However, as we
have outlined above, Ohms held that under the Utah
Constitution core judicial functions can be
performed only by duly appointed judges. Thus, in
accordance with our holding today, only duly
appointed judges can issue search warrants. Court
commissioners are not judges, and thus they cannot
issue search warrants.
Any attempt by the
legislature to statutorily confer the power to issue
search warrants upon court commissioners would be
null and void as a violation of the Utah Constitution.
We do not hold the above-stated statutes
unconstitutional,
however,
because
section
78-7-17.5(1) clearly grants magistrates the power to
issue search warrants, "(ejxeept as otherwise
provided by law."
Second, the State argues that the issuance., of a
search warrant is not a core judicial function
involving the exercise of ultimate judicial power but
rather involves a nonadjudicative preliminary matter
that simply assists the court in moving die case
along.
Certainly, many actions are capable of
"assisting" courts, including tbt performance of core
judicial functions.
Thus, determining whether a
particular action assists a court does not end the
inquiry.
As we have noted, functions that
commissioners can constitutionally *304 perform are
those that constitute recommendations or other
functions that are reviewable by a judge. Issuing a
search warrant cannot be characterized as either a
recommendation or an action that is reviewable by a
judge.
The commissioner in this case did not
recommend to the judge that the warrant be issued
but rather issued it herself. Similarly, the decision
to issue was not subject to review by a judge with
the possibility of disallowing the search. Rather,
the order to search and seize was issued and then
executed immediately thereafter.
Furthermore,
while the issuance of a search warrant is a
"preliminary" decision when looking at a criminal
prosecution as a whole, it is a final decision as to
whether a search will occur. Thus, while issuing a
search warrant does not rise to the level of finality
as entering judgment and imposing sentence, as was
disallowed in Ohms, it is sufficiently final to
establish it as a core judicial function. We thus hold
that because the issuance of a search warrant is a
core judicial function, which cannot be performed
by a court commissioner, the court of appeals erred
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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when it held that Ohms did not apply.
Thomas also objects to a court commissioner
presiding over his first appearance. He argues that,
similar to issuing a search warrant, presiding over a
first appearance is a core judicial function that
commissioners lack the authority to perform.
However, Thomas fails in his brief to identify or
describe this hearing or discuss what the
commissioner's actions were and how these actions
constituted the exercise of core judicial functions.
Thomas cited only to the Third Circuit Court's
docket sheet stating that a first appearance took
place. A review of the record reveals no further
evidence of the first appearance.
It does show,
however, that Thomas's preliminary hearing was
held before Circuit Court Judge Phillip K. Palmer
and that it was he who bound Thomas over for trial
in Third District Court. Rule 24(aX9) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an appellant's
argument to contain the "reasons of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented ... with citations
to the ... parts of the record relied on." Thomas
has failed to comply with these requirements. His
brief is totally inadequate, and therefore, we decline
to address this issue.
II
[81 The second issue we address is whether the
court of appeals erred when it declined to address
Thomas's claim that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress a positive eyewitness
identification made from a suspect photo array
because Thomas failed to adequately brief the issue.
The court of appeals stated:
Thomas ignores several decisions addressing
proper challenges to photo amy cases* See Stale
v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111 (Utah 1994);
State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432, 433 (Utah 1989).
Because Thomas fails to adequately brief this
argument, it is without merit and we decline to
address it.
See Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9)
(requiring "citations to the authorities [and]
statutes ... relied on").

trial transcript. On the basis of the trial testimony,
Thomas then asserted that the photo array was
overly suggestive. His only reference to any legal
authority is contained in the bald assertions that the
identification also taints any other identification of
Mr. Thomas in violation of due process under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. The overly suggestive photo
array also violates Art. I, § 7 of the Utah State
Constitution (Due process); see also State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).
These statements concluded his argument.
[9] It is well established that a reviewing court will
not address arguments that are not adequately
briefed. State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 368 n. 5
(Utah 1995) (refusing to address defendants state
due process argument where argument entailed only
superficial statement concerning Utah's unique
history and reference to another part of defendant*s
•305 brief); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966
(Utah 1989) (declining to rule on issue where
defendant's brief "wholly lack(ed] legal analysis and
authority to support his argument");
State v.
Amicooe, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984)
(declining to rule on separation of powers argument
where argument was not supported by any legal
analysis or authority).

Thomas, slip op. at 3.

In deciding whether an argument has been
adequately briefed, we look to the standard set forth
in rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. This rule states that the argument in the
appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented ... with citations to the authorities, statutes
and parts of the record relied on." Implicitly, rule
24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority
but development of that authority and reasoned
analysis based on that authority.
We have
previously stated that this court is not" a depository
in which the appealing party may dump the burden
of argument and research.' " State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v.
Opsahl, 92 m.App.3d 1087, 48 Ill.Dec. 510, 511,
416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)).

A review of the record reveals that Thomas devoted
four pages of his brief before the court of appeals to
his photo array argument. However, almost three
of these pages consisted of direct quotes from the

[10] In his brief to the court of appeals, Thomas did
cite to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution, to article I, section 7 of
the Utah Constitution, and to the case of State v.
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Ramirez. However, this is all he did \ i lalysis of
what this authority requires and o f h o w the facts o f
Thomas's case satisfy these requirements w a s
wholly lacking. The court o f appeals also noted,
"Thomas ignores several decisions addressing proper
challenges to photo array cases." Thomas, slip op.
at 3. While fa.ilu.rc to cite to pertinent authority may
not always render an issue inadequately briefed, it
does s o when the overall analysis o f the issue is s o
lacking as to shift the burden o f research and
argument to the reviewing court.
Because o f
Thomas's lack of analysis, the photo array issue was
inadequately briefed and the court o f appeals was
justified in declining to address it

Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals
holding that Salt Lake City v. Ohms does not apply
to the issuance of a search warrant.
Issuing a
search warrant is a core judicial function involving
ultimate judicial power. We remand the case to the
court of appeals for a determination as to whether
the trial court1 s failure to suppress evidence obtained
from the search constituted reversible error. We
further affirm the court of appeals' holding that
Thomas inadequately briefed the photo array issue.
Associate CJ and
H0WE
CJ^ DURHAMf
STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur in
Justice RUSSONs opinion.

CONCLUSION
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DAVIS, Judge:
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This case is before us oa remand from ^ae Utah Supreme
Court, SSA State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998), The sole
issue is "whether the trial court's failure to suppress evidence
obtained from*the [illegal] search constituted reversible error."
id. at 3 0-5
We ho3 d that i t does not
invalid search amounts to a v i olat ion
federally protected constitutional right, "we will aff ...
defendant's conviction only if we can say, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that defendant would still have been convicted . . . even
if the trial court had not admitted the improperly seized
evidence.11 stata v. Sinovaii. 909 P.2d 916, 922 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) . The evidence seized pursuant to the search was the
baseball cap, sunglasses, gun, and bank bags with some coin
wrappers and gift certificates. Had this evidence been
suppressed, the jury had before it a positive and unequivocal
eyewitness identification from the store manager who had spent
several minutes studying defendant's face while in the store, a t::!
had come face-to-face with defendant several times while
defendant forced the manager across the store parking lot. A
neighbor immediately next-door to the apartment at which
defendant had been staying directed the police to the apartment.
Becauae

tjie

< ! ! !: !, >

Upon arrival, the police were able to see defendant inside and
confirmed the neighbor's report that a man matching the
description given by the Kentucky Fried Chicken employees was
there. The police guarded the apartment until defendant emerged.
Most importantly, defendant's voluntary and uncoerced confession
that he had committed the robbery was also before the jury.
Comparing the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant with
the overall strength of the prosecution's case, we hold that the
admission of the seized evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt because "the evidence that was erroneously* admitted did
not significantly contribute to defendant's conviction and other
properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly
established his guilt."
£2& Genovesi. 909 P.2d at 923.2

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

t<Judith M. Billings, Judge

1. We note the exemplary conduct of the police in this matter
and that the "error" could not have been reasonably anticipated
by either the police or the trial court.
2. Because of our disposition, we do not reach the State's
argument that exclusion of the seized evidence is an
inappropriate remedy. Se^ state v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886 (Utah
1989). We find defendant's jurisdictional arguments, including
those styled as a "Motion/Memorandum for Appointment of Counsel,"
without merit and decline to address them, gee id.. and issuance
of this decision renders defendant's "Motion for an Expedited
Decision of Appeal" moot. Lastly, even if we assume defendant's
"Affidavit for Change of Venue[] and Prejudice" is a proper
pleading, it is without merit and we do not reach the issues
raised therein. See id.
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The judgment appealed is summarily ailirmea on the coui fs o J t i motion as the
issues raised are so unsubstantial as not to merit further proceedings or consideration by
this court. Utah R App. P. 10(a)(2). It is noted that the same issues are raised in Thomas'
direct appea 1 of his crimina I conviction, and it is clear that extraordinary relief does not lie,
since there is another plain, speedy and adequate
has already pursued. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B.

Ordci
Remittitur Issued: May I1!,, 1 ' ft
Record: None
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and have for one reason or another been required to recuse
themselves.
Petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing before the Court in
this matter.
reviewing

The Court has made a determination, however, after

respondent's Motion to Dismiss, together

with the

thorough and well-prepared Memoranda filed by both parties in this
case in connection with the Motion that there are no factual issues
in dispute, and that the Court can rule in this case as a matter of
law.
It appears that petitioner's complaints center on pretrial
matters that have either been resolved on appeal, could have been
resolved on appeal, or are of such a nature that they would not
invalidate the valid conviction and sentencing of this defendant,
and accordingly the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner argues that the search warrant issued in this
matter by a Court Commissioner was invalid. That issue was decided
on appeal, with a determination that the search warrant was invalid
as it was issued by a Commissioner, but the court ruled that the
failure to suppress the evidence obtained from the search did not
constitute reversible error. This matter has been raised and dealt
with on appeal.
Petitioner's Memorandum challenges the arrest warrant and the
Information charging the defendant•

First, the Court notes that
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these issues were not properly raised in petitioner's Petition.
These are also issues that could have been raised on appeal.

In

addition, there was a valid arrest warrant as to some unrelated
parole violations that had been issued for petitioner, and thus
petitioner was already in the custody of the State. Lastly, these
irregularities are cured by a subsequent valid conviction.

See,

gUt? Vt QVtfrg, 837 P.2d 565 (Utah App. 1992).
It appears that petitioner may also be arguing that he was
arrested without an arrest warrant and did not thereafter receive
a probable cause determination on the arrest warrant.

Again,

however, there was an outstanding warrant for petitioner's arrest
for parole violation.

When petitioner was arrested, the booking

Information shows that he was arrested and booked for parole
violation, as well as for the new charge of Aggravated Robbery.
Again, however, this preliminary matter, even if deemed to be an
irregularity, is cured by defendant's later conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court has ruled that "although a

suspect who is presently detained may challenge the probable cause
for the confinement, the conviction will not be vacated on the
ground that the defendant was detained pending trial without a
determination of probable cause." Gerstein v. Pucrh, 420 U.S. 103,
95 S.Ct. 854 (1975).

See also,

State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264

(Utah 1985).

*; •' < f C
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Petitioner has also raised in a very vague way a challenge to
the parole revocation hearing. However, the specifics of his claim
are unclear, but he appears to be challenging the Board's warrant
of arrest, the Board's credit for time served ruling, and the
timeliness of the parole revocation hearing.
The Court is of the opinion that the argument that the Board's
warrant was invalid is without merit.

Secondly, this Court would

not review a decision by the Board of Pardons refusing to grant a
prisoner credit for time served, as that is within the discretion
of the Board.

Lastly, the petitioner's argument regarding the

timeliness of the Board of Pardons revocation hearing is without
merit as it appears that the petitioner specifically waived his
right to a pre-revocation hearing by signing the waiver of prerevocation hearing. Petitioner cannot now complain that he did not
have a pre-revocation hearing in a timely fashion.

If petitioner

is arguing that his full revocation hearing was untimely, then he
has provided nothing to the Court upon which it could base a
decision.
Petitioner claims for the first time in the Memorandum in
Opposition to the Motion that he is entitled to relief by virtue of
the fact that he did not receive a trial within 120 days of his
first appearance in court.

This argument fails first for the

reason that it was not raised or addressed in his original or

*>v:«s;>
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Amended Petition for Extraordinary Relief.

It was not listed by

the Court as those issues to be addressed in the hearing before the
Court on June 28, 2000.

It is raised for the first time here in

response to the respondent's Motion to Dismiss. It must also fail
because it is an issue that could have been raised and addressed on
appeal, but was not.

Lastly, it must fail because the record

before the Court makes it quite clear that the delay in bringing
petitioner

to trial was

(See,

largely of his own making.

respondent's "Response to Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Motion
to Dismiss Petition for Extraordinary Relief p. 12, et seq.,

for

a summary of the record in this case pertaining to this issue.)
The Court also notes that petitioner on two occasions requested a
continuance of his trial, and specifically waived his right to a
speedy trial.
Petitioner argues that his conviction is invalid by virtue of
the fact that he did not receive a preliminary hearing within ten
days of his arrest.

The record shows that the Information was

filed against petitioner on July 6, 1993.
was scheduled for July 13, 1993.
rescheduled

A preliminary hearing

The preliminary hearing was

numerous times at the request

of petitioner and

petitioner's counsel due to numerous changes in petitioner's
counsel and for other reasons. In addition, the petitioner waived
his right to a preliminary hearing, however, the Court proceeded

"V3S4
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14, 1993, and the

petitioner was bound over. The petitioner has not demonstrated to
this Court that the preliminary hearing was not continued for good
cause. Petitioner's argument that the bindover was invalid, since
it was done by a Circuit Court judge rather than a magistrate is
without merit.
The Court determines that the grounds relied upon by Mr.
Thomas in his Petition for Extraordinary Relief are without merit,
and can be disposed of as a matter of law as stated above, and the
respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
Counsel for respondent is to prepare an appropriate Order.
Dated this Cr c^day of February, 2001.

FRANK G. NC
DISTRICT C0URT JUDGE
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Erin Riley, # 8375
Assistant Attorney General
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UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for Respondent
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,

vs.
Case No. 950900814
STATE OF UTAH,
j

Judge FRANK G. NOEL

Respondent.

This matter comes before the Court on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. The Court has
carefully considered the pleadings submitted in this matter, including but not limited to, the Petition,
Motion to Dismiss, Response, and Reply, and now being ftilly advised in the premises, enters the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On August 4, 1995, a jury convicted petitioner of one count of aggravated robbery. On
December 4, 1995, petitioner was sentenced to five years to life in prison.

2.

Petitioner appealed his conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in

an unpublished memorandum decision. State v. Thomas, No 960170-CA (Utah App. Nov. 29,
1996)(unpublished).
3.

The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari in case #970049. The Supreme Court

reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998).
4.

As to the portion of petitioner's case which was remanded, on February 25,19991 in

a memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction incase #961170-C A.
The Utah Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 21, 1999.
5.

On February 7,1995 (prior to his conviction and subsequent appeal), petitioner filed

a petition for extraordinary relief. He filed an amended petition on March 27,1995.
6

The case was assigned to several district court judges who successively recused

themselves.
7.

Through various proceedings, it appears that the petition was dismissed and

reinstated several times.
8.

On February 2,2000, the court entered a minute entry which stated: "It appears to the

Court then that this matter has been dismissed with prejudice, and accordingly, the Court will take
no further action in this matter as the case is deemed to be closed by the Court/'
9.

Through new counsel, petitioner filed a motion to vacate the minute entry.

10.

The minute entry was vacated and respondent was ordered to file a response to the

petition.
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11.

Respondent responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss, to which petitioner filed his

12.

Petitioner argued that the search warrant issued by a Court Commissioner was invalid.

Reply.

That issue was raised and dealt with on appeal.
13.

The Post-Conviction Remedies Act states that a person is not eligible for relief upon

any ground that "was raised or addressed... on appeal" or that "could have been but was not raised
... on appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-i06 (l)(b) & (c) (1996).
14.

Petitioner challenged the arrest warrant and the Information charging him. These

issues were not properly raised in the petition. In addition, the allegations concerning the arrest
warrant and Information could have been raised on appeal.
15.

Also, there was a valid arrest warrant as to some unrelated parole violations that had

been issued for petitioner. Therefore, petitioner was already in the custody of the State under the
parole warrant.
16.

Petitioner challenged the Parole Board's warrant of arrest, the Board's ruling

concerning credit for time served, and the timeliness of his parole revocation hearing.
17.

Petitioner specifically waived hisrightto a pre-revocation hearing by signing a

waiver of pre-revocation hearing.
18.

A decision as to whether to grant a prisoner credit for time served is within the

discretion of the Board.
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19.

Petitioner has provided no information to the Court upon which it could base a

decision as to whether his full revocation hearing was untimely.
20.

Petitioner claimed for thefirsttime in his Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion

to Dismiss that he was entitled to relief because he did not receive a trial within 120 days of his first
appearance in court. This argument was not raised or addressed in his original or amended petition.
In addition, this claim is an issue which could have been raised and addressed on appeal.
21.

The record makes it clear that the delay in bringing petitioner to trial was largely

of his own making. For instance, on two occasions, petitioner requested continuance of trial, and
specifically waived hisrightto speedy trial.
22.

Petitioner argued that his conviction was invalid because he did not receive a

preliminary hearing within ten days of his arrest
23.

An Information was filed against petitioner on July 6,1993. A preliminary hearing

was scheduled for July 13,1993. Thus, the preliminary hearing was originally schedule within ten
days of petitioner's arrest, however the hearing was rescheduled numerous times at the request of
petitioner and his counsel.
24.

In addition, petitioner waived hisrightto a preliminary hearing, however, the Court

proceeded with the hearing on December 14, 1993.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes the following:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There are no factual issues in dispute, therefore, the Court can rule in this case as a

matter of law.
2.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1996), petitioner is not entitled to relief upon

his claim that the search warrant was invalid, because this claim was raised and dealt with on appeal.
3.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claims challenging the arrest warrant and'the

Information because these issues were not properly raised in his petition.
4.

In addition, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1996), petitioner is not entitled to

relief upon his claims challenging the arrest warrant and Information because these issues could have
been raised on appeal.
5.

Petitioner is also not entitled to relief upon his claim challenging the arrest warrant

because he was already in the custody of the State under the parole warrant.
6.

Petitioner is also not entitled to relief upon his claims challenging the arrest warrant

and Information because any irregularity was cured by petitioner's subsequent valid conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt
7.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to his claim that the Parole Board's warrant was

invalid, because his argument that the Parole warrant was invalid is without merit.
8.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to his claim that he did not have a timely pre-

revocation hearing because he specifically waived hisrightto a pre-revocation hearing.
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9.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to his claim regarding the Board's ruling

concerning credit for time served, because this Court may not review a decision by the Board of
Pardons refusing to grant a prisoner credit for time served, as that is within the discretion of the
Board.
10.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to any claim that his full revocation hearing was

untimely, because he provided nothing to the Court upon which it could base a decision concerning
the timeliness of the full revocation hearing.
11.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to his claim that he did not receive a trial within

120 days because this argument was not raised or addressed in his original or amended petition.
12.

In addition, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1996), petitioner is not entitled to

relief upon his claim that he did not receive a trial within 120 days because this argument could have
been raised on appeal.
13.

Petitioner is also not entitled to relief as to his claim that he did not receive a trial

within 120 days because his own actions were the cause of the delay, and the disposition period must
be extended by the amount of time during which the prisoner himself creates the delay.
14.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to his claim that he did not receive a preliminary

hearing with ten days of his arrest, because the hearing was continued at the request of petitioner and
his counsel, and because petitioner has not demonstrated that any continuances were not for good
cause.

-6-

15.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to his claim that his bindover to District Court

was invalid, since it was done by a Circuit Court judge rather than a magistrate, because this claim
is without merit.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby GRANTS Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
and ORDERS that the petition is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

n

DATED this aL3- day o

BY THE COURT:

JNORABLE FRANK G. NKJL'
Judge, Third Judicial District Ca^rt ^ t " * ^ ' ' *•'
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Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted
March 9, 2001 by:
Erin Riley
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
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Erin Riley
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Karl R. Cannon
Attorney for Petitioner

-8-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

of March, 2001,1 mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to:
Karl R. Cannon
Clayton, Howarth & Cannon, P.C.
10150 South Centennial Parkway, Suite 400
P.O. Box 1909
Sandy, Utah 84091-1909

<2z*^y £*Jt ££.
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Deputy'

Erin Riley, # 8375
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, # 4666
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for Respondent
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD DEE THOMAS,
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner,

vs.
Case No. 950900814
STATE OF UTAH,
Judge FRANK G. NOEL
Respondent

For the reasons stated in the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and its
Memorandum Decision entered in this matter, the Court hereby ORDERS that the Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief is hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice.
DATED thi

day of MarcO; 2001.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE TRANK G.
Judge, Third Judicial District Court

Proposed Order Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief submitted
March 9, 2001 by:
Erin Riley
Assistant Attorney General
MARX L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6* Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
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Erin Riley
Assistant Attorney Gemeray
Attorneys for Respondent

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Karl R. Cannon
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the y

aav of March, 2001,1 mailed, postage pre-paid, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing [Proposed] ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF to:

Karl R. Cannon
Clayton, Howarth & Cannon, P.C.
10150 South Centennial Parkway, Suite 400
P.O. Box 1909
Sandy, Utah 84091-1909

fec^^ fcdjJLp,
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ADDENDUM G
(Timeline)

A review of the file and docket shows the following timeline:
7-6-93
7-7-93
7-13-93
8-25-93

Information filed.
Petitioner referred to LDA.
Defense attorney Patrick Anderson to represent petitioner.
Petitioner wishes to fire counsel. Motion by Anderson to
withdraw is granted.
9-1 -93
Case sent to conflict attorney.
9-7-93
New counsel is L. Clark Donaldson.
9-27-93
Petitioner fires defense counsel Donaldson and waived speedy
hearing (preliminary hearing) due to firing of Donaldson and
prior counsel. Donaldson to notify LDA for appointment of
alternate counsel.
11 -2-93
Continuance - new counsel is James Haskins.
11 -23-93 Petitioner files motion for new counsel.
12-06-93 Defense attorney Haskins withdraws. Petitioner is informed
that each time he fired another attorney, that time was
stayed on his 120 day detainer. Preliminary hearing set for
12-14-93.
12-14-93 New counsel is Earl Xaiz. Petitioner expresses dissatisfaction
with counsel. Court refuses to disqualify counsel and proceeds
with preliminary hearing. Petitioner is bound over to district
court. Arraignment is set for 1-3-94.
12-16-93 Information filed in District Court.
12-17-93 Arraignment re-scheduled for 1 -10-94. Defense counsel Xaiz
files motion to withdraw.
1 -10-94
Petitioner's motion for new counsel is granted. Arraignment
continued to 2-7-94.
3-18-94 Arraignment reset to 3-28-94.
3-29-94
Court requests LDA to appoint new counsel. Arraignment reset
to 4-18-94.
4-18-94
Arraignment continued to 4-25-94 so defense counsel can be
present.
4-25-94
Felony Arraignment before Judge John Rokich. New counsel is
Kevin Kurumada. Trial set for 8-2-94
7-12-94
Stipulated motion to continue trial granted. Scheduling
conference set for 8-1-94.
8-1 -94
Affidavit of defendant filed to have jury trial vacated and
motions heard.

8-22-94
9-12-94
10-14-94
10-24-94
12-12-94
12-16-94

1-9-95
1 -23-95
2-15-95
2-24-95

5-22-95
6-12-95
8-01-95
8-3-95

Defense counsel Kuramada filed motion to withdraw.
Kuramada's motion to withdraw is granted. Court asks LDA to
appoint new counsel.
Petitioner's motion to dismiss on grounds that statute of
limitations has run and that he was not afforded a speedy
trial is denied.
Petitioner present with new counsel, Mary Corporon.
Petitioner waives right to speedy trial. Trial set for 12-13-94.
Petitioner's motion to have counsel withdraw and to defend
himself is continued for hearing.
Petitioner waives time for speedy trial and WAIVES 120
DAY DISPOSITION. Defense attorney Mary Corporan is
allowed to withdraw so that defendant may represent himself
with aid of standby counsel.
Scheduling conference is continued at request of new counsel.
Trial is set for 3-23-95.
Motion to allow withdrawal of counsel Bradshaw.
Counsel Bradshaw's motion to withdraw is granted. New
counsel appointed - Bel Ami Montreux. Petitioner waives
right to speedy trial and petitioner's motion to continue is
granted. Trial reset to 5-30-95.
Matter reset to 6-12-95 to define issues and set hearing.
Scheduling conference held. Motion hearing set for 8-1-95.
Jury trial set for 8-3-95.
Petitioner's motion to have counsel withdraw and represent
himself pro se is denied. Petitioner's motion to continue
trial is denied.
Trial.

(R. 2122-23 and 2238-77).

